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412 STATE BRO'fHERHOOD OF R R. C.2d 
F. Xu. li-\00:3. In Bank. .)nne :20, 
S'l'A'l'E (H' CALIPORNIA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. 
BIWTHEIUIOOD OF' HAIIJROAD THAINMEN (an 
I DAVID 
[1] Statutes-Operation Against State.-Statutes whieh in 
terms divest preexisting rights or privileges will not be applied 
to a in the absence of express words to that effeet, 
unless there are extraneous and affirmative reasons for be-
lieving that the sovereign was intended to he af'f,,cted. 
[2] Master and Servant- Statutory Regulation.- Considerations 
which may justify application of general safety and taxing 
measures to state-owned carriers are not controlling in deter-
mining the intended scope of a statute which purport,.; to 
regulate and supervise employer-employee relationships. 
[3] Statutes- Interpretation- Legislative Intent. Courts must 
look to the subject matter of a particular statute and to the 
terms of the enactment in its total environment in order to 
determine legislative intent. 
[ 4] Public Employees-Applicability of State Laws.~-~W ages, hour·s 
and working conditions of government employee~ must be fixed 
by statute or ordinance, and state laws which, in general terms, 
secure the right of employees to enter into collective bargaining 
agreements with respect to those matters are not intended to 
apply to public employment. 
[5] !d.-Federal Legislation.-In a dual system of government in 
which, under the federal Constitution, the states are sovereign, 
save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their 
authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control 
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to 
Congress. 
[6] Id.- Nature of Employment: Commerce- Regulation. The 
fact that operation of a railroad by the state may be described 
as a proprietary activity is immaterial in considering the 
characteristics of public employment or the intended scope of 
congressional legislation regulating interstate commerce. 
[4] See 15 Cal.Jur. 577; 7 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.) 457; 
31 Am.Jur. 849. 
McK. Dig. References: Statutes, § 20; [2] lVIaster and Ser-
vant, § 4; [3] Statutes, § 126; [4, 10] Publie Employees; [6] 
Public Employees: Commerce, § 3; Labor, § 1.1; [8] Waters, 
§ 435(1); [9] State of California,§ 18. 
,j BRo'rHERHOOD OF H. R. TRAINMEN 41:3 
C.2d 412; 232 P.2d 857] 
Labor Act.-The federal 
Labor Act U.S.C.A. § 1;51 et for collective 
to wages and conditions of railway 
not to a state-owned and operated 
l8a, 8b] Waters-Harbors-Harbor Commissioners-Compensation 
of Employees.-There is no between Gov. Code, 
~ the approval of 
together. 
salaries, and Harb. & Nav. Code, 
the Board of State Harbor Commissioners 
and the sections should be con-
[ 9] State of California-Fiscal Matters.--The purpm;c of legisla· 
tion to the Department of Finance general powers of 
supervision over matters coneerning financial and business 
of the state Code, § 13070) is to prevent im-
providence, and to control expenditun~ of state money by any 
of the departments of the state. 
[101 Public Employees-Compensation.-~As~uming that to require 
approval of Harbor Board employees' salaries by the Depart-
ment of J<'inance would be tantamount to transferring to the de-
partment the power to "fix" compensation for Harbor Board 
employees, Gov. Code, § 18004, must be regarded as modifying 
all earlier legislation authorizing specific state agencies to fix 
their employees' salaries. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Andrew R. Schottky, 
,Judge. Reversed. 
Action for deelaratory relief to determine validity of a 
1:ontract. Judgment for defendants declaring contract valid, 
reversed. 
l<'rrd N. How;;;er, .iltt.orney General, and Herbert E. Wenig. 
D1'pntr Attorw'r GPnrral. for Plaintiff and AppPllanL 
./amPs H. Phillips for Interv0ner and Appellant. 
( 'Jifton Hildebrand for Hespondents. 
GIBSO:-.J, C. ,J.-'l'he State of California brought this action 
for declaratory relirf to determine the validity of a contraet 
entered into by rPspondent brotherhoods and the Board of 
*Assigned by Chairman of ,Judicial Council. 
414 STATE BROTHERHOOD OF' R. R. TRAINlVrEN C.2d 
vYorking conditions of 
This appeal \Yas taken from a 
ents dt>claring the eontraet valid. 
the rates of pay and 
of the State Belt Railroad. 
in favor of 
The Belt Railroad is owned and thr statr, and 
statute to the 
& Nav. 
its management and eontrol are committed 
Board of State Harbor Commissioners. 
~§ 3150-3165.) The railroacl parallels the waterfront of San 
Francisco harbor, exten<ling to some 4fi wharves and dirP<'t.ly 
srning approximately 175 industrial plants, and it has trac;k 
or frright-ear ferry ronnectiom; with three interstate railways. 
'rhe Belt line facilitates the freight traffic of the l1arbor h.\· 
moving freight ears betwern the various steamship ('ompanirs, 
industrial plants and railroad earriE'rs with which it haP 
eonnE'ctions, and it servrs as a link in the through transporta-
tion of interstate freight Rhipped to or from points in San 
Francisco over the cmmrcting carriers. It iR settled that 
thE' Belt Railroad is engaged in intrrstate rommrrE'e. ( Unifrd 
Stafrs Y. State of Califonlia. 297 U.S. 17!) [56 R.Ct. 421. 80 
hEel. 567]; State of Cal?"form·a v. Anglim, J29 F.2d 455; 
1Jtaurice ,-. State Califor11ia. 43 Oal.App.2d 270 rno P.2d 
7061.) 
The railroad employs betwrE'n 125 llnd 225 persons, the 
nnm her dept>nding upon the volume of bnshwss. The Con-
stitution of California providrs that these emplo:vt>t>s nrr 
mrmberR of the state rivil RE'rvirr, and under the Civil Rrrvier 
Aet thr appointmt>nt, elasRifieation. promotion, flalar:v mngeR. 
hours and general working E'Omlitions of all mrmhrrR of tbr 
riYil serdre art> govrrnE'(l h~- provisions of that act anil h~· 
rr!Ynlatiom; of the Rtatr PPrsonnE'l Boaril. { Oal. Oonst .. art. 
XXIV. § 4: r.ov. Ooilr. §§ ] 8fi00-l 076fi. I CompenRation of 
rmplo:vee« wiH1in thr ranges set hy thr Rtatr Prr::;omwl Board 
ma.\" be fixed h~· thr Harbor Boanl (TTarb. & NaY. Co(1r. 
~ 1705). ;::ubjPct to npproval h~· thr ;::tatr Dt'partmrnt of 
Finaner. (G0Y. Co1lr. ~ 18004.1 
On Srptrmbrr 1. 1942. thP Bo;;ml of Statr Harbor Com-
missionrrs and rrRponilPnt brothE'rlJOods. the 
railroad employers. enterE'd into thr contract im·oh·ed. 
In Q'enrral, the contract fixe;:; matter;:; pa~- anr1 
IYOt'king conditions whieh arE' b~· ciYil 
srn·iee ;:;tatutes and and eertain of it;:; proYisions 
eonflict in substance with eivil srrvice laws on the subjects 
of promotions. lav-offR. 1ravE's of absenee. accumulation of sick 
lraYP am1 prm•Pdnrrs for r1ismis>;nl. dE'motion and sns]Wl1Rion. 
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The contract the result of collective between 
respondent brotherhootls and the Harbor Board, and the par-
ties concede that it has IteYer been appron•d the Department 
of l''iuanee. 
The state eontends that the coutract is invalid because the 
aff,~dcd are melllbers of the state civil serviee and 
that their pay aud couditions are to be governed 
exel usi vely legislation or administrative rules aud not by 
<·iJllel'tive bargaining contract. A similar contention is made 
the a Bl'lt Hailroad who claims that 
his benefits aud pri vile.ges are less under the provisions of 
the eontrad than under the state Civil Service Aet, and that 
lle is entitled to proteetion of the laws governing state employ-
meHt. 1t is respomleuts' positiou, however, that the state, as 
OWllPt' of the Belt Hailroatl, is subjeet to the federal Hailway 
J,aboJ· Aet whieh se<:rtl'<'S to employees of railroads engaged 
in interstate commerce the right to enter into collective bar-
gaiJJing agreements with their employer concerning rates of 
pay, rules and working conditions. ( 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151, 152.) 
Aeeordingly, rt•spondents argue, the eontract is valid and 
;;upersedes all provisions of the state Constitution, the Civil 
Serviee Aet, and rules and regulations of the State Personnel 
Board whieh are inconsistent therewith. 
'l'he Hailway l,abor Aet requires all common carriers by 
railroacl, tbeit· officers, agents, and employees "to exert every 
reasollable dl'm·t to make and maintain agreements eoneerning 
t·atPs of pay, rules and vvorking eonditions, and to settle all 
disputes, whether rising out of the application of such agree-
ments or otherwise, in orde1· to avoid any interruption to 
eommen,r .... " (4G U.S.C.A. § 152.) It provides that em-
ployees shall have the right to organize and bargain colleetively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and it sets up 
a pro(•Hlnre for the settlement of disputes by conference of 
repre;;entatiws of employer and employees and, failing solu-
tion thPre, by rdPnm('e to the National Railroad Adjustment 
Hoard, trw National :Mediation Board, or arbitration. ( 45 
!'.S.C .. \. §§ 1:12-1:>5, 157.) Orders of thr National Railroad 
Adjustment Board may be enforcPd by action in United States 
Distrid Courts, and juc1g·ment may be entered on awards 
whieh aJ'P t}H' result of arbitration. (45 U.S.C.A. §§ 153p, 159.) 
The aet fixes tl1e pt·oeedure employers must follow in chang-
ing 1·ates of pay, rules or working conditions, requiring thirty 
days' notice and conference with employee representatives; it 
further provides tl1at no sueh changes shall be effective until 
416 
final aetion 
ofT('fS its serviem.; or eitlwr 
§ 156.) Pnnishment in the form of fines and 
pn•seribrd for who fail to 
ad. U.S.C.A. § 152 tenth.) 
[1] The Rail·way Labor Act does not io 
state-owned railroads C.S.C.A. 151 , and well 
sPttled that statutes which in general terms divest 
rights or privileges will not be applied to a 
ab:-;enee of expresR words to that unless there are ex-
traneous and affirmatiw reasons for believing that the soy. 
ereign was intended to be affected. (United States v Um'ted 
Mine 1Vorke1·s, 330 U.S. 258, 272-273 [67 S.Ct. 677, 686, 706. 
91 L.Ed. 884]; United States v. WHtek, 337 U.S. 346, 359 
I 69 S.Ct. 1108, 1115, 93 L.Ed. 1406] Parker v. Brown, :317 
U.S. 341, 350-351 [63 S.Ct. 307, 313, 87 L.Ed. 3151; Balthasar 
v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 187 Cal. 302, 305-306 [202 P. 37, 
19 A.hR. 452] ; cf. United States v. State of California, 297 
l'.S. 175, 186 [56 S.Ct. 421, 425, 80 L.Ed. 567].) In United 
States V. State of California, S11pm, 297 U.S. 175 r 56 S.Ct. 
421, 80 LEd. 567], which also involved the Belt Railroad. 
the Supreme Court found reasons for believing that Congress 
intended to include stateR within the operation of the federal 
Safety Appliance Act. The court stated that the purpose of 
the statute there involved was to protect employees, the publie 
and commerce from injury because of defective app1ianees 
on interstate carriers and that no convincing reason had been 
advanced why it should not apply to all carrier:;;, whether 
private or state owned. The Belt Railroad has also been he1(1 
subject to the federal Employers' I1iability Act and the fp(leral 
Carriers Taxing Act. (2lfa1m:ce v. State of California, 4:1 
Ca1.App.2d 270 [110 P.2d 706]; State of Cal1:jornia v. Anr;lim. 
129 F.2d 455.) [2] However, considerations \vhich may 
justify the appliration of general safety and taxing measnrrs 
to state-owned carriers are not controlling in determining tlw 
intended scope of a statute which purports to regulate am1 
supervise rmployrr-employee relationships. [3] We mnst look 
to the subject matter of a particular statute and to the terms 
of the enactment in its total environment in order to deter-
mine legislative intent, and there are, we believe, affirmative 
reasons which indicate that Congress did not intend the Rail-
way I1abor Act to apply to state-owned carriers. 
It is most significant that, while one of the major pnrposeR 





542-544 J . ) A 
concise statement of the characteristics distinguishing public 
from in this appears in a letter 
from President Roosevelt to the National Federation of Fed-
eral Employees, dated 1937: "All Government 
employees should realize that the process of collective bar-
gaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into 
the public service. It has its distinct and insurmountable 
limitations when applied to public personnel management. 
The very nature and purposes of Government make it im-
possible for administrative officials to represent fuJly or to 
bind the employer in mutual discussions with Government 
employee organizations. The employer is the whole people, 
who speak by means of laws enacted by their representatives 
in Congress. Accordingly, administrative officials and em-
ployees alih: are governed and guided, and in many instances 
restricted, by laws whieh establish policies, procedures, or 
rules in personnel matters." (Quoted in C£t11 of Springfield 
v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239 [206 S.W.2d 539, 542-5431 ; C.I.O. v. 
r?ity of Dallas, (Tex.Civ.App.) 198 S.W.2d 143, 144-145.) 
[4] Recent authorities hold uniformly that the wages, 
hours and working conditions of government employees must 
be fixed by statute or ordinance and that state laws which, in 
general terms, secure the right of employees to enter into 
colleetive bargaining agreementfl with respect to those matters 
are not intended to apply to public employment_! (Nutter v. 
rJity of Santa Monica, 74 Ca1.App.2c1292 [168 P.2c1 7411; C1"ty 
'It should be notr-d that we are not h0re roneerned with the right of 
pnhlie employees to join or form labor orgunizntionR or to urge the 
proper exNcise of diseretionnry authorit~· rxeentin' nnrl ndministrative 
officers. (See City Sprin.fJfteld v. Cim1se, :\fo. 1230 f206 S.W.:2d C.;i9, 
7.42-5431; City of A. v. LoR An,qe/es etc. Comwil, 04 Cnl.Apv.2rl 36, 
4:J r210 P.2d 305]; 1 Tellm·, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining 
[ 1040 ed., 1947 Snpp.l ~ 171. p. 113-119; Rhyne. Lahor Unions :md 
:\funieipal Employe Law fHJ46 ed.l ~ 1, p. 21-3:1; Rhyne, iil., Supp. Rep. 
f1949] § l, p. 8-15: 54 Harv.I~.Rev. 1360 (19411; cf. C.I.O. v. City of 
Dallas, (Tex.Civ.App.) 198 S.W.2d 143, H:i-147; SPattle Hiqh School 
Chap. No. 200 v. Sharples, Hi9 Wasl1. 424 f2rlil P. !194, 72 A.L.R. 12IG].) 
37 C.2d-H 
~lo. 123D [206 S.\Y 
Miami Water Works Local No. 654 
165 A~.L.l1c. ; see v. 
C01mcil 185 ~ld. 266 [44 A.2d 
162 A.L.R. 1101] Hagerman v. City Dayton, 
147 Ohio 313 N.E.2d 246, 253, ; 1 'reller, IJabor Dis-
and Collective 1947 
The Labor Relations Acts of several states ov""',"" 
exclude employees from their provisions 
collective bargaining,2 and it has been held that such 
erimination does not constitute a violation of equal protection. 
(Railway Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 95 [65 S.Ct. 1483, 
1488, 89 L.Ed. 2072] .) 
Congress itself has eonsistently excluded state employment 
from the operation of other labor relations statutes enacte\l 
nnder the commerce or war power. The National Labor Rela-
tions Act of 1937 and the subsequent Labor Management 
Helations Act of 1947, which secure the right of collective 
bal'gaining to employees of employers engaged in interstate 
commerce, expressly provide· that the term employer as used 
in the aets does not include the United States or any state 
or political subdivision. (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141, 152(2).) Th<• 
Fair Ijabor Standards Aet of 1938 likewise expressly excludes 
governmental employers from its provisions (29 U.S.C.A. 
§ § 201, 203d), as does the War Labor Disputes Aet of 1943. 
(50 U.S. C.A. § § 1501, 1502d.) 'rhese statutes indicate a uni 
form congressional poliey that the relationship between a statP 
and its employees is not to be eontrolled by the federal 
g·ovPrnment even where those employees are engaged in inter-
state commeree, and so closely related in purpose is sueh labor 
legislation with the Railway Labor Aet that the Supreme 
Court has characterized eolleetive bargaining provisions of 
the Railway Act as the "analogue" of similar provisions in 
the National Labor Relations Aet and has given parallel inter-
pretation to sertions of the two acts. (National Labor Rela-
tirms Board v. Jones & Laughlin S. Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44-45 
!57 S.Ct. 615, 627-628, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 13521.) 
1Tnder a11 the cireumstances, it is obvious that application 
of the eol1eetive bargaining requirements of the Railwa.v 
"Fla., Stat.Ann., rh. 453, ~ 453.17; Mass., Ann. Laws, ch. 150 B ~ 2; 
:Vfinn., Stat. Ann. eh. 17!), § 179.01, subd. 3; N.Y., Con~ol. Laws, eh. ilO. 
art. 20, § 715; Penn., Stat.Ann., title 43, § 211.3; R.I., Lnws 1 fl41 eh. 
1066, § 16; Tex., 15 CiY.Rt., art. fil:i4e; 'Gtah, Code Ann.1fi~:J, 49-1-10 
Wis., Stats. 1939, c. fi7. 
l! . BRO'l'HEHHOOD 0[;' lL ll. 'l'HATN::IIEK 41 !) 
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Labor to would constitute an unprece-
dentPd interfPrenr:e ·with a state's traditional method of fixing 
the eonditions of its and it seems doubtful 
that had sueh an intent [5] As stated in Parkrr 
. Brou'?l, :117 FS. :141,:151 168 S.Ct. :307, 87 L.l1Jd. :3151, 
"fn a dual of in whieh, under tlle Con-
;;titnlion, thA states are saye as Congress may 
snbtract from their an 
pilrJ!Ilse to nnllii'y a statr. 's control rWAr its offirers and agents 
not to he attributed to Congress.'' 
'rhr legislatiw· history of the act givrs no indieation that 
it was intPndrcl to affrd llH:'\' hut private ellrrien;. Prior to 
its; Pnartmrn t in ] ~2fl, Congress bad passed a series of l mYs 
rlrsigned to bring about peacefnl settlement of railroad c1is-
pntrR, hnt 11011r had the fnll support of both the rarrien; and 
their employees, and 11rbitration machinery set up under 
proYisions of tlJP 1 !120 •rransportation .Act had proYrn par-
tienlar]~- inrffertiw. (Srr fl7 C:ong. Rrr. 4509-4513 . .J-516; 
T'irqinirm Ry. no., .. 8ystrm Ji'rdrration No. 40, 300 FS. fi15, 
:142 [ G7 S.Ct. 5!12. 007, 81 L.Ed. 78fll ; Texrrs & N.O.H. Co. ,-. 
BrotluThood of Ry. & 8.8. Clrrks, 281 U.S. 548, 562-5()3 
f!'iO S.Ct. 427. 431, 74 hEeL 10341.) In 1925 representatiyqs 
of some 58 major priYate railroads and 20 lAbor organizations 
met and Pntereo into prolonged negotiations OYer legislation 
whirh wonlrl be satisfartory to all interests. And the Railway 
Labor Rill was tllr product of these conferences. (See fl7 
(\mg. Rre. 4!504-4fi0fi, 4522. 4524, 4583, 4652. 8807: Tc:ras & 
N.O.R. r:o. Y. Rrnfherltood of RJt. cf· 8.8. Clerks, supra, 281 
fT.S. !148, ?ifl3 fRO S.Ct. 427. 4:n. 74 T.J.E(L 10341.) Tdentiral 
hills f'mhocl,·ing the propo,:;als of the unions and tlle railroads 
·n-err introdnr•ed in each Honse of Congress by the chairm;m 
of its rommitter 011 intrrstate commerce, and, after pnblir 
hearings. the Railway I1ahor Bill was passed witllout r;:nh-
stantial amrnilmrnt. (Srr fl7 Con;r. Rec. 4504-4505: Cllam-
h,rlain. Thr Railway Lnbor Aet (1!1261 12 A.B.A .• Tom. 6:3:3.) 
Tl111s th0 Rail·wa:- T;llbor Art hasie11l1y represented tllr agrPr-
!TJrlJt of labor org-anization;:; 'Yitll priYatf~ earriers. We h:wr 
hrrn ritrd to no instancr in the rourse of passage of the bill. 
and haYe discoyerrd none, in which the (jnrstion w11s rair;:r•d 
as to \Yhethrr statr-ownrd railroailR WHE' intenderl to lw 
nffer~te'l. 
::\Iany of the purposes stated in the Haiiway r~abor Ad a~·e 
similar to some of the purposes of the Norris-IJa Guardia Aet 
,,-hieh \\·ere diseusscd in United States v. United Mine Workers, 
420 
and designation of to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that 
he shall be free from the or coercion 
of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of 
such representatives . . . for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining. . . . '' 1'he court then observed, ''These considera-
tions, on their face, obviously do not apply to the government 
as an employer or to relations between the Government and 
its employees." In a separate concurring opinion ,Justices 
Black and Douglas added the following, ''Congress never 
in its history provided a program for fixing wages, hours, and 
working· eonditions of its employees by eollectivc bargaining. 
·working conditions of Government employees had not been 
the subject of collective bargaining, nor been settled as a 
result of labor disputes. It would require specific congres-
sional language to persuade us that Congress intended to 
embark upon such a novel program or to treat the Government 
employer-employee relationship as giving rise to a 'labor dis-
pute' in the industrial sense." (330 U.S. at 328-329, 67 S.Ot. 
at 713.) 
Those provisions of the Railway IJabor Act which fix a 
mPthod for the settlement of disputes by conference of em-
ployer and employee representatives, and, thereafter, by 
reference to federal adjustment or mediation boards or to 
arbitration, are equally inappropriate to the relationship be-
hn•Pn a state and its employees. Normally, a state provides 
mrtho<~s for the settlement of disputes and grievances of its 
Pmplo:w<'s vvithin the framework of its own government,3 and 
a g'PlH'rll] C'ong-rpssionaJ provision for the handling of disputes 
hrtwrrn rmployrrs and rmployres would, we think, be in· 
tPnc1Pc1 to apply only to private individuals or corporations, 
and not to a sovereign state. 
[6] We can find no legitimate reason for making any dis-
thwtion in the prrsrnt case between governmental and pro-
3 The California Civil Service Act provides for investigati011s or hearings 
by the State Personnel Board of disputes and other matters arising under 
the C'idl Snvicp Art nnd administrntivr ruks. (GoY. Code, §~ H\i\70-




2il CaL2d [178 P.2d 






ao2 [ J 6b P .2d see Rhyne, Ijabor 
!'niOlJS and Employe r_~aw [19,16 § 7, p. 53-56; 
id., Snpp.Hep. [ 1949 J § 7, p. 81-82; 1 'l'eller, [,abor 
and Colle<:tiYc [1940 1947 Supp.] 
171, pp. 117, 118.) 
[7] In vi(•w ot our eo1wlusion that Co11gress did not in-
tend the Hailway Labor Aet to apply to state-owned and 
operateu carriers, we need not consider whether Congress 
t·ould constitutionally undertake to regulate the relationship 
between a state and its employers, and vve likewise need not 
determine whether applieation to a state of provisions for 
enforeement of orders of the Hailroad Adjustment Board and 
arbitration awards in federal courts \vould constitute a viola-
tion of the Eleventh AmPmlmrnt to thr fedrral Constitution. 
The jnrlgltlent in the JH't•sent easr' must be rPvrrsPCl for 
the further reason that, assuming the statr is subjrct to the 
Hailway Labor Act am1 t1Hlt stat(~ eiYil service rPgulations 
are stqwrsederl b,\' of that act, the Harbor Board 
dmlcl not proprrl\· enter into thr eontraet with the brother-
hoods and bind the state without the approYal of the Depart-
ment of ]'inanee, ns required by srction 18004 of the Gov-
ermnent Code. 4 (8a] There is no inconsistrney between 
sectiou 18004 and the provision in seetion 1705 of the Harbors 
and NaYigation Corle authorizing· the Board of State Harbor 
Commissioner,;: to fix the salary of its rmployees. 5 [9] 'rhr 
"Section 18004 : "Unless thtJ LegiHlature specifically )lrovides 
that appt·oyal of of Piname is not required, whenever 
any State fixes the salary or compensation of an employee 
or officer, salary is payable in whole or in part ont of State funds, 
the salary is subject to the of the Department of Pinance before 
it becomes effective and " (As added in Hii:J, based on former 
Pol. Code, § 67:i.L) 
"Section I /0.) proYidPs, ''. Tht' Bonnl slwll fix 01e compensation of 
its officers and employees other than the commissioners ... , " (As 
amended in 194:1.) Prior to 194:3 the section read as follows: '' ... 'rlw 
salaries of [certain specified officers l shall he fixed by the hoard with 
the approval of the Director of Pinance. 'fhe board shall fi.x the eom· 
pensation of other employees. . . , '' 
4'i') Fl'rATE BROTIIERHOon (W IL R. 
rtmvni or l•'infllll'(' is general power::; of 
on'r a II nw11 ers the financial and bm;iness "v'"''"'J' 
of tlH• Ntate. (( ;o\·. ~ ] :3010, based on former PoL 
~ 634.) The purpose of f'neh [(•gislation is to conserve the 
financial int<'ru,.;ts of the state, to prevent improvidence, ailll 
to tontrol the of ~,;tat(o money any of tlH• 
sevel'al departments of the state. 11 
70, 72 P.2d .) (8b] Since sections 
18004 and 170i) may be harmonized, should be construed 
together and with reference to tht~ ·whole system of whieh they 
form a part. (See Cohn v. 45 Cal.App. 531, fi:HI-537 
[188 P. 2791; Irclancl v. Riley, snpnt, 11 Cal.App.2d 70, 74-76 
[52 P.2d 10211 ; Chilson \'. Jerome, 102 Cal.App. 685, 641 
[28:3 P. 862[.) [10] Moreover, eyen if we were to aceept the 
argument that the reqnirement of approval of salaries by the 
Department of F'inance is tantamount to transferriug to the 
department the power to ''fix'' eompensation of Harbor Board 
l~mployees, the legislahno intent to ereate supervisory powers 
in the departrrwnt is so clear and unmistakable that sedion 
18004 mu:>t be regarded as modifying all (~arlier legislation 
anthorizing spe(·ific; state to fix the salaries o[ their 
('!llployees. 
'l'he judgment is reversed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, .J., Traynor, .r., Schauer, J., and 
Spenee, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J .-I dissent. 
The majority opinion holds that employees of the state 
engaged in the operation of the State Belt Railroad, a state 
operated carrier engaged in interstate commerce, do not have 
the protection afforded by federal Railway Labor Act. ( 45 
U.S.C.A. §§ 151-152.) Cnder that act working conditions and 
rates of pay are fixed by a collective bargaining agreement 
between the employer and the union representing the em-
ployees. 'l'he majority holds that it was not intended by 
Congress to include the state as a carrier-employer; that the 
employees are subject to the state civil service laws, and that 
the Board of Harbor Commissioners are authorized to fix the 
salary of sueh employees with the approval of the Director of 
Finance. That result is reached on the following bases: 
( 1) rrhe rule of statutory construction that a statute does 
not apply to the goYernment unless it is named; (2) The rates 
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conditions of 
Congress has '' 
excluded the state from labor laws The history of the 
None of those valid and the conclusion is 
to the determinations on the sub-
State 297 U.S. 175 [56 
S.Ct. , the same Belt Railroad was involved 
and the court ·was concerned with the federal Safety Appliance 
,\.ct. ( 45 ES.C.A. § 1, et seq.) That act has to do with 
standards of in train equipment. 'fhe particular prob-
lem presentcd 'Was whether California was subject to the 
provision of the aet for failing to comply with the 
safety standard. 'l'he court held that it was, and in so holding, 
stated prineiples whieh make it a binding precedent in the 
instant case. It found that the Belt r~ine is engaged in 
interstate commerce. A unanimous court said: "The state 
urges that it is not subject to the federal Safety Appliancr 
"\et ... it is said that as the state is operating the railroad 
without profit, for the purpose of facilitating the commerce 
of the port, and is using the net proceeds of operation for 
harbor improvement, ... it is engaged in performing a pub-
1 ie function in its sovereign capaeity and for that reason 
•·rmnot eonstitutionally be subjeeted to the provisions of the 
fNlerH I 1\ ct. In any ease it is argued that the statute is not to 
hr construed as applying to the state acting hi that capacity. 
'' ... 'l'he on]~- question we need consider is whether the 
exereise of that power, in iYhatever capacity, must be in sub-
ordination to the power to regulate interstate commerce, 
which has bren granted specifically to the national goYern-
ment. The soverC?·gn power of the states is necessarily dimin-
ished to the extent of the grants of power to the federal gm·ern-
menl in the Constitution . ... 
"Crdifornia. br engaging in interstate commerce by rail. 
liM.; :-:nb.ic'etP<1 itsrlf to the <'ommrrec pmwr, and is liable for 
a Yiolation of the Safrt)' Appliance Act, as are other carrirrs. 
nnless the statute is to be deemed inapplicable to state-ownr<l 
railroads because it dors not specifically mention them. Tlw 
federal Safrty Appliance Aet is rrmedial, to protect employees 
and the public from injury because of defective railway 
appliances, . . and to safeguard 1·nte1·state commerce itself 
from obstruction and injury due to defective applianres upon 






were not The same con-
United 
4 Ann.Cas. 
snpra, [293 U.S. 214 
(55 S.Ct. 171, 79 J_~.Ed. 291) J. Similarly the Interstate Com-
merce Commission has regarded this and other state-owned 
interstate rail carriers as subject to its although 
the Interstate Commerce Act does not in terms apply to 
state-owned rail carriers. . . . 
"Respondent invokes the canon of construction that a 
sovereign is presumptively not intended to be bound by its 
own statute unless named in it, . . . The presumption is an 
aid to consistent construction of statutes of the enacting 
sovereign when their purpose is in doubt, but it does not 
require that the aim of a statute fairly to be inferred be 
disregarded because not explicitly stated. . . . We can per-
ceive no reason for extending it so as to exempt a business 
can·ied on by a state from the otherwise applicable provis1'ons 
of an act of Congress. all-embracing in scope and national 1'n 
its pu.rpose. which is as capable of being obstructed by statr 
as by individual action. l;anguage and objectiws so plain 
are not to be tlnvarted by resort to a rule of construction 
whose purpose is but to resolve doubts, and whose application 
in the circumstances would be highly artificial. It was dis-
rrgarded in Ohio v. H elve1·ing, supra, and Sotdh Carolina v. 
TTniteil States. supra. See Heiner v. Colonial Trust Co., 275 
TT.S. 2~2. n4. 2~fi r 4R S.Ct. 65. 72 TJ.Ed. 2561." (Italics 
added.) 
Th0 forrg-oing is prr0isPly prrtlnf'nt in thr instant rasP. 
'J'hr pnrposf' of tlw Railwa:-· Labor Act, Hkr thr Safrty Ap· 
nlianrr Art, is to safrg-nard f'Ommer<w from obstruction. ( 4;) 
TT.S.C.A. ~ l51a: Slocum v. Delaware L. &; W. R. Co .. 33!) 
TT.S. 239 r7o S.Ct. 577. 94 LEd. 7951.) The purpose being 
thr samr the application of th(~ acts should be the same. To 
af'h ievr that purpoRe Cong-resR has provided means of assnring-
nracea blr labor rrlations whirh are rlearl:v appJicable when 
thr state is a rarrirr. It has drclarrd the policy that the 
pnrposr may be attained by collective bargaining and thr 
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mediation board rather than the State Personnel Board. If by 
federal mandate the state must its inanimate equipment 
it must also deal with its employees according to the 
manner set forth in the Labor Act-a federal mandate. 
lt has been held that the state is subject to the federal 
Carriers' Act the Belt Line, which act 
for the purpose of revenue to pay for retirement 
railroad ; that the federal statutory right to 
receive retirement pay is binding upon the state. In State of 
v. Anglim, 129 F.2d 455, that issue was presented. 
There is no possible basis to distinguish that case from the 
one at bar and the majority opinion makes no attempt to do 
so. If payment of retirement to state employees of a state 
earrier is controlled by the federal law although the state 
is not named in the statute, certainly federal statutory pro-
visions for collective bargaining which embrace wages and 
working conditions are binding on the state. Retirement or 
pension payments have always been considered as deferred 
compensation or wages. Moreover, under the majority hold-
ing an anomalous situation is created. The payment of wages 
before retirement would be controlled by state law while 
subsequent wag·es (pension payments) would not. The analogy 
between the cases compels the same result. Hence the majority 
opinion violates the fundamental rule that a state court is 
bound by the construction of a federal statute by a federal 
eourt. (Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 [59 S.Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed. 
104] .) 
In discussing a federal statute requiring consent of Con-
gress for the construction of a dam on navigable streams, the 
eourt said in United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174, 184 
[55 S.Ct. 666, 79 L.Ed. 1371] : "These provisions unmis-
takably disclose definite intention on the part of Congress 
effectively to safeguard rivers and other navigable waters 
against the unauthorized erection therein of dams or other 
structures for any purpose whatsoever. The plaintiff main-
tains that the restrictions so imposed apply only to work 
undertaken by private parties. But no such intention is ex-
pressed, and 1ve are of opinion that none is implied. The 
measures adopted for the enforcement of the prescribed rule 
arc in general terms and purport to be applicable to all. No 
Yalid reason has been or can be suggested why they should 
apply to private persons and not to federal and state officers." 
(Italics added.) 
In State of Cal1:fornia v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 [64 
and in answer to the daim that 
)\ct did not to the eity, stated that the issue was no 
open at this late States v. State 
su.pra, 2!17 U.S. 175. shall 
is much a matter the 
relations with 
1t has 
for the recovery of railroad 
suffered in the course of their 
ment, applies to the Belt Line here involved. Maurice v. 
J:Jtate of 43 Cal.App.2d 270 P.2d .) No 
attempt is made to distinguish that case and it cannot be done. 
The act in question deals with the and duties as be~ 
tween employer and employee the same as the Labor 
Act. 
Finally, the identical here has been 
decided. ln National Counc·il, etc. Union v. 56 .B'.Supp. 
720, the court Jealt with whether patrolmen, hired by the 
eity to patrol the harbor where the operated a 
were subject to the Hailway Labor Act. '!'he court held they 
were not because they were not employees of the city as a 
carrier, but said, citing the cases heretofore discussed: "Most 
of the cases cited by Plaintiffs throw some light on the 
question of coverage, but are not controlling. United States 
v. State of California, ~97 U.S. 56 S.Ot. 80 L.Ed. 
567; State of Cal·ifornia v. Latimer, 305 U.S. 257, 59 S.Ot. 
166, 83 L.Ed. 159, and State of California v. Anglim, 9 Cir., 
129 J:<'.2d 455 of course, settle it that a r-ailroad, etc., owned by 
the State or as here by a City wh·ich ·£san agency the State 
is, under certain circ·um:stances and perhaps generally speak-
ing, within the coverage of the l Railway Labor] Act.'' 
(Jtalies added.) That case was affirmed on appeal (152 .B'.2d 
500), the court not discussing the instant point but deciding 
that whether the patrolmen were under the act must be de~ 
cided by the Interstate Commerce Commission. It should 
be noted that there had been no determination here that 
commission. 
As above seen, we have three unqualified instances in 
which feder·al statutes dealing with the relationship between 
the employe1· and employee in the raiJroad field have been 
held to be applicable to the state with reference to the same 
Belt Line Hailroad. Yet, in face of this wealth of authority, 
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for 
. No effort 
sttpra, and 
The act itself (Railway 
It must be liber-
L. Ry. V. 
A. F. 93 F.2d 340, cert. 
!i4l1 S.Ct. 82 L.Ed. 1110] ), and it has been held that 
it applies to the reeeiYer of a railroad (B1tr·ke v. Jlrlorphy, 109 
11'.2d 572), although the receiver is subject to the control of 
the court. 
The ~"<'Ollft argument of the majority that rates of pay and 
\r<Jrldng eonditions of pu blir·. employees are traditionally a 
mntt0r of Rtate Rtatntory and administrative regulation does 
not shed an:· light on the subjeet. 'rhat argument applies with 
eqnal foree to rights arising under provisions for retirement, 
for injuries in the course of employment, and the safety re-
quirements. They are no less traditionally regulated, as to 
public employees, by statute and administrative regulation. 
Neyertheless the eases hold, as above shown, that the fedocal 
railroad ]a"·s control because of their effect upon interstate 
<·ommerce. 
That has "consistently" excluded the state from 
labor laws--~the third grouncl---is equally untenable. If that 
is true, then it supports m~· position, for Congress thought 
it mnst nse language excluding the state when it desired to 
flo so. and it did. But it did not employ such language in 
t hr Railway Labor Act and in tl1e field of employer-employee 
relations in the railroad industry. and the courts have con-
held that the federal legislation includes the state. 
of thr history of the act-the fourth ground·--
is wholl:· It is said that it 
no inctication that the state as a carrier was to be in-
eluded. But it no indication to the contrary. True, 
the act probabl.v arose out of cooperation between the unions 
and but no doubt the other federal railroad 
la\YR \Yere similarly initiated. 
The majority opinion sets forth the additional ground for 
invalidating tlH' contract that it waR not approved b:· the 
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of Finance of the State. There has been a sub-
stantial, although informal, approval by the state of the 
eontract. It has been in force sinee 1942, and wages have 
been paid according to the rates provided for therein since 
that time. The Department of Finance knew of such payments 
and gave implicit approval of them, for it "may from 
all such of the State, financial and statistical ''"'"'\lP'"" 
duly verified, covering the period of each fiscal year." (Gov. 
Code, § 13291.) And "may examine all records, docu-
ments, accounts and all financial affairs of every agency men-
tioned in Section 13290." (Gov. Code, § 13293.) And it 
''shall examine and expert the books of the several State 
agencies, at least once in each year, and as often as the director 
deems necessary.'' (Gov. Code, § 13294.) Hence it has ex-
llmined the books and records of the Harbor Board, which 
>vould include the collective bargaining contract and the pay-
ments to employees and has found them proper. 
It is apparent that the last mentioned issue should not be 
so lightly brushed aside. The majority holds that the Harbor 
Board has the right to fix the pay of the employees subject 
to the approval of the Department of Finance and also that 
such employees are under civil service. If they are under 
civil service it is very doubtful that the Legislature may pro-
vide that their rate of pay be fixed by the Harbor Board or 
he subject to the approval of the Department of Finance. 
The rateR of pay certainly relate to civil service for the 
PerRmme] Board is empowered by statute to fix the rate of 
pay. (Gov. Code, §§ 18500(1) (6), 18850 et seq.) The Con-
Rtitution vests civil service matters exclusively in the State 
Personnel Board. "Said board shall administer and enforce, 
and is vested with all of the powers, duties, purposes, func-
tions, and jurisdiction which are now or hereafter may be 
vested in any other State officer or agency under, Chapter 
!190 of the California Statutes of 1913 as amended or any and 
all other laws relating to the State civil service as said lawR 
rna~· now exist or may hereafter be enacted, amended or re-
pealed h.v the IJegislaturr." (Cal. Const., art. XXIV,§ 3(a).) 
I rreeondlable conflicts in state and federal law will neces-
sarily result from the holding of the majority in this case. 
Under its holding, State Belt Railroad employees are under 
civil service. but their salary must be fixed by the Harbor 
Board with the approval of the Department of Finance. This 
holding is in conflict with both the Constitution of California 
and the Gowrnment Code (see Cal. Const., art XXIV, § 3(a) 
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Go-:. § 20000 et seq.) which 
rates of pay, dismissals and the like are all within 
of the State Personnel Board, and that there 
a state l'("tircment system ·which embraces all civil service 
All such automatically become members 
must to it as m 
, the instant are civil service 
must be members of the state retirement 
and contribute to it, but the majority opinion concedes 
that they are subject to the federal Hailroad Employees' 
Hetiremeut Act (see State California v. A.nglim, 129 F.2d 
455). There is no basis for splitting the complete system of 
employer-employee relations between the state and its em-
ployees into parts, some of which are controlled by state 
law and others by federal law. The majority holding leads 
to absurd results. 'I'his would be avoided by a holding that 
all of the federal statutes relating to railroad employer-
employee relations apply to State Belt Hailroad employees. 
'rhe trial court and the District Court of Appeal so held in 
this case (State of CalifoTnia v. BrotheThood of Railroad 
Trainmen, ( Cal.App.) 222 P.2d 27). That holding is ('mi-
nently sound. 
T would, therefore, affirm the judgment. 
'rhe opinion was modified to read as abo-:e printed and 
r<cspondents' petition for a rehearing was denied ,Tnly 19, 
1951. Carter, .T., voted for a rehearing. 
